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ABSTRACT
MATTHEW KARL SUESS: The Scottish Court of Session and Federal Supremacy in the
United States
(Under the Direction of Dr. Sheila Skemp)

The federal court system under the United States Constitution varied substantially from
the English judicial system. This thesis will explore the extent to which the Court of
Session, Scotland’s highest court, influenced the form of the United States federal court
system. First, the thesis will examine the Acts of Union of 1707, the contract binding the
kingdoms of England and Scotland into one political body. The language of the Acts of
Union, specifically the language regarding the form and power of the Court of Session,
will serve to draw a parallel with the United States Constitution. Next, the thesis will
explore the nature of the judiciary in the Early Republic, especially the purpose of the
framers of the Constitution and the role, organization, and individuals of the pre-Marshall
Supreme Court. Here, the thesis will focus especially on the views and writings of James
Wilson, an original Associate Justice of the Supreme Court who was bom and educated
in Scotland. Finally, the thesis will investigate McCulloch v Maryland 17 U.S. 316
(1819) and the establishment of, and objections, particularly those of Virginians Thomas
Ritchie and Spencer Roane, to, federal supremacy, and the court’s defense of that
supremacy, in the United States of America.
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Chapter I

The Acts of Union and the Scottish Judiciary

Justification for the Union between England and Scotland

The Union with Scotland Act and the Union with England Act, collectively
known as the Acts of Union, bound together, by means of a unified Parliament in
London, the kingdoms of England and Scotland. While this unification of legislative
authority became official in 1707, the two nations had maintained a unified monarchy for
over a century, since James VI of Scotland became James I of England on the death of his
1

cousin, Elizabeth I of England, in 1603.
The dilemma faced by the collective authors of the Acts of Union was the need to
create a document that would hold two sovereign nations together by mutual consent. To
accomplish this, the document had to balance each nation’s desire to maintain a modicum
of political autonomy with the strong and efficient central government necessary to keep
and expand the empire.^ The Acts of Union are of vital importance to the study of

' The two nations were ruled, successively, by James 1 & VI, Charles I, Charles 11, James 11 & Vll, and
William of Orange. It was under the rule of Queen Anne, the successor of William of Orange, that the
kingdoms of England and Scotland were united under the Acts of Union,
^ The union of Scotland and England was largely one of convenience. The hundreds of years of animosity
that separated the two nations did not immediately dissipate upon the passage of the Acts of Union by their
respective Parliaments. Mutual bigotry was prevalent throughout the early decades of the union. As such,
there were movements calling for greater degrees of separation between the two peoples, especially in
response to the growing number of Scots well-positioned in the London government. See: Linda Colley,
Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707-1837,(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), Chapter 3.

1

seventeenth and eighteenth-century British-American politics because the timing,
structure, and language of the document gave a solid form to the political theory of the
British Empire midway through a century-long period of political upheaval following the
English Civil War.^
The period between the English Civil War and the passage of the Acts of Union
of 1707 saw a drastic change in political philosophy in England. The two major political
philosophers of this period were Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Hobbes and Locke,
though contemporaries living in the same country, took two very different views of
government.
The theme of the state of nature appeared in the works of both Thomas Hobbes
and John Locke. Both philosophers attempted to imagine human interaction before the
creation of government. They posited, however, two distinct states of nature.
Hobbes believed that human life in the state of nature was “nasty, brutish, and
short.„4

That is to say, before the foundation of government, humans struggled for

survival. Hobbes thought that humanity required a government to control individuals,
prone to violent and self-interested behavior, in order that society might thrive. The only
way, according to Hobbes, for this to happen was “to confer all their power and strength
upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, that may reduce their wills, by plurality of

^ The period between the end of the English Civil War, in 1651, and the ratification of the Constitution in
1787 featured (1) the abdication, and popular replacement, of the English monarch, the divinely sanctioned
head of both the state and the church,(2) the writings of such political philosophers as Hume, Locke, and
Wilkes, (3) the realization of a united Britain, (4) the explosion of popular politics, (5) the American
Revolution, and (6)the radical restructuring of the American government under the Constitution. This was,
without question, the period of greatest change in British-American political history.
Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme and Power ofa Commonwealth Ecclesiastical and
Civil ed. Michael Oakenshott(New York: Collier Books, 1962),98

2

voices, unto one will.

Humans, then, must relinquish their personal freedom for the

ordering of society.
Hobbes’s experience during the English Civil War profoundly influenced his
political philosophy.

For over a decade, bitter fighting between monarchical and

parliamentary armies ravaged the nation and destroyed English productivity and
commerce. Hobbes came to two fundamental conclusions in response to this conflict.
First, he believed that good government required unity. Hobbes argued that the division
of power between the monarchy and Parliament directly led to the war. Second, Hobbes
contended that any government necessarily required strength and centralization to avoid
falling back into anarchy.
Locke, on the other hand, took a far more optimistic view of the state of nature
and its ramifications. While Hobbes thought that all personal rights stemmed from the
government, Locke wrote that certain rights, including the rights to life, liberty, and
property, were granted to each man as a birthright. This stance led Locke to posit a very
different purpose for government than Hobbes. For Locke, the overarching purpose of
government was to protect the citizens from intrusions on their rights.
In his account of the state of nature, Locke imagined humanity “living according
to reason, without a common superior on earth, to judge between them,

Life was not.

then. nasty, brutish, and short,” as Hobbes claimed, but was generally peaceful and
relatively enjoyable. Humans agreed to form a government not out of necessity or fear,
but because forming a government gave each individual the greatest opportunity to
prosper.

Since the foundation of government, according to Locke, was to protect

^ Thomas Hobbes, 100.
^ John Locke, Two Treatises ofGovernment ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press,
1960), 287.

3

humans’ inherent rights, men and women did not forfeit these rights when forming a
government. Indeed, government, according to Locke, protected the rights which no
person had the right to give away.
The collective relinquishing of perfect personal freedom, agreed on by both
Hobbes and Locke, became known as the social contract. Each individual in a society
agreed to “authorize and give up my right of governing myself, to this man, or to this
assembly of men, on this condition, that thou give up thy right to him. as well.^
Government, then, required an equal surrendering of rights by all inhabitants and the
consent of the governed.
The views of Thomas Hobbes and John Locke of the state of nature and the
relationship between the individual citizen and the government showed the changing
dynamics of politics in seventeenth-century England. The work of Hobbes and Locke
evidenced a change in the conception of government. The two, though coming to very
different conclusions, forced a reconsideration of the role of the English government.
The Acts of Union of 1707, created after the publication of The Leviathan and the Two
Treatises of Government, founded the new government of Great Britain in line with the
contractual model espoused by both Hobbes and Locke. While the Acts of Union did not
establish the government of Great Britain out of a state of nature, the agreement between
the two nations reflected the political theories of Locke and Hobbes regarding the
contract between subject and sovereign.
Though the Acts of Union of 1707 reflected the development of the social
contract theory, the separate kingdoms of England and Scotland would only have ratified
the Acts of Union if they appeared to be beneficial to both kingdoms. England and
^ Thomas Hobbes, 100.
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Scotland had been enemies for hundreds of years. The two nations developed quite
differently. England became a major force in European and world affairs, while Scotland
remained largely on the periphery. In spite of the differences in culture and history, the
Acts of Union attracted each kingdom,for very different reasons.
The English exhibited a strong interest in a union with Scotland. England desired
the efficiency and security that a union with Scotland would allow. Since 1603, the
kingdoms of England and Scotland had shared a monarch. Since that time, a number of
monarchs, including James VI and I, had attempted to unite the two kingdoms. A union
of England and Scotland would allow the monarch to establish a true seat of government
rather than travel between kingdoms. Before the union, the monarch spent most of the
year in England, and was largely absent in Scottish affairs. The union, finally agreed
upon more than a century after the ascension of James VI and I, allowed the two
kingdoms to benefit from a more efficient structure of government.
For centuries, Scotland had been a threat to invade the north of England. While a
substantial threat to the prosperity of the northern border of England, Scotland did not
possess, on its own, the power to mount a successful invasion of England. Its attacks
took the form of raiding along the English-Scottish border. After the establishment of the
Church of England, however, the threat of invasion from the north increased
dramatically. France and Scotland, both Catholic kingdoms, joined in an alliance upon
the marriage of Scottish Queen Mary Stuart and French Francis II in 1558. The alliance
gave Scotland access to the French army and treasury,

This alliance posed a very

legitimate threat to the security of England. The union with Scotland gave England the
chance, once and for all, to feel secure in its northern border.

5

For Scotland, too, union with England provided substantial benefits. Foremost,
such a union allowed Scotland and its merchants to participate in the trading networks
already established by England. This opened new markets to Scottish goods, increasing
profits for Scottish merchants. It also brought goods from around the world, spices from
Asia, wood and raw materials from North America, sugar from the Caribbean, into
Scotland. The union with England allowed Scotland to flourish economically.
Socially, a union with England opened new opportunities open to educated Scots.
8

Since the fifteenth-century, the sons of Scottish nobles were required to attend school.

This led to a profound rise in literacy among the Scottish nobility. Two hundred years
later, after the union, Scotland experienced a period of scholarly growth known as the
Scottish Enlightenment.

Such thinkers as Francis Hutchinson, Adam Smith, David

Hume, and Lord Karnes were part of an era of exceptional learning. Scotland became
known throughout Europe as a center for education.
The empire presented the educated sons of the Scottish elite with opportunities
never before available. Educated men sought adventure and fortune on the peripheries of
the empire. Scots were particularly prominent as military officers and governors in
British India and the North American colonies.^ Indeed, James Madison, in his notes on
the Constitutional Convention eighty years after the implementation of the Acts of Union
wrote that “whoever looks over the lists of public officers. Civil & military of that nation
[Great Britain] will find I believe that the North Britons enjoy at least their full

“ Education Act 1496.
^ Linda Colley, Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992), 120.

6

vio

proportion.

The Acts of Union of 1707 provided Scotland with financial and social

opportunities too significant to pass up.
The Acts of Union of 1707, the founding document of the Kingdom of Great
Britain, joined the kingdoms of Scotland and England.

The document built on the

political philosophy of the period to create a contract between the kingdoms.

Most

importantly, England and Scotland joined together because the arrangement benefitted
both nations. The Acts of Union of 1707 allowed both kingdoms to prosper.

The Acts of Union

The Acts of Union of 1707 attempted to deal systematically with all foreseeable
problems stemming from a union between England and Scotland. From stating the name
of the new nation, to providing for the succession to the throne, to taxes, to common
weights, the document outlined every aspect of the new government. The Acts of Union
expounded upon, to some extent, the role of the monarchy, the Parliament, and the courts
of the new kingdom.
As with any political document, the language in the Acts of Union is extremely
important. As historian Daniel Howe argues, understanding the “intellectual conventions
II

of an age” is vital to “defining an author’s intention,

Certain phrases are of great

importance to any attempt to understand the underlying theory behind the Acts of Union.
The purpose of the document was to bind the two nations of England and Scotland
10

James Madison,“Notes on the Constitutional Convention” in Records ofthe Federal Convention oj 1787
ed. Max Farrand(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), Vol. I, 198.
;
● .
"Daniel Howe,“The Political Psychology of the Federalist,” The William and Mary Quarterly. Third
Series, 44 (1987): 486.

7

hereof, and forever after...into One Kingdom.

12

The wording of the document left no

lingering doubt about the strength or legitimacy of the union. The Acts of Union sought
to establish a united and perpetual succession to the throne of the new kingdom, to unite
the legislative bodies in a single Parliament in London, and to guarantee the equal rights
of all subjects. In achieving these goals, the Acts of Union sought to ensure the perpetual
union of England and Scotland.
The Acts of Union of 1707 guaranteed the equal rights of all British subjects. All
inhabitants of the new kingdom were to have all of the “Rights, Privileges, and
13

The document

Advantages which do or may belong to Subjects of either Kingdom,

granted inhabitants of Scotland legal rights and protections in England. This proved
especially important in regards to the expanding empire. It meant that Scots were able to
apply for civil and military posts throughout the empire. By granting equal rights and
privileges to each group of inhabitants, the Acts of Union hoped to bind the nations
together by mutual consent, each recognizing the greater benefits, militarily and
financially, afforded under the new agreement.
England established a substantial trading network with its colonies around the
world. Colonies in North America, the Caribbean, Africa, and Asia allowed the English
economy to expand and stabilize in the seventeenth-century. During this period, many
»14

Englishmen believed that “trade and patriotism were inseparably linked,

Because of

this focus on trade, the Acts of Union of 1707 dedicated a large amount of time to
defining the economic relationship between England and Scotland.

Thirteen of the

articles in the Acts of Union deal, either directly or indirectly, with the economy.
Union with England Act 1707, Article One.
Union with England Act 1707, Article Four.
Colley, 120.

8

Articles Six through Eighteen attempted to merge the economies of England and
Scotland. Article Six established a national customs union to regulate trade. It also
canceled all existing tariffs between Scotland and England. Articles Seven to Fourteen
dealt with taxation. Articles Seven and Eight provided for taxes on liquor, salt, meat, and
fish, while Article Nine outlined proportionate taxation for the two kingdoms. Articles
Ten through Fourteen enumerated the English taxes that would not apply in Scotland,
15

including taxes on stamps, windows, coal, and malt,

Articles Fifteen to Eighteen

established a common currency as well as common weights and measures and common
trade laws.
Of the twenty-five articles of the Acts of Union, one is of singular importance in
terms of the role of the judiciary in eighteenth-century Britain. Article Nineteen of the
Acts of Union outlined a perpetual separation of the English and Scottish courts. For a
document meant to bind the two nations together, the apparent disparity is especially
noteworthy.
Article Nineteen allowed the high court of Scotland, the Court of Session, to
“remain in all time coming within Scotland as it is now constituted by the Laws of that
>»16

Kingdom, and with the same Authority and Priviledges as before the Union.

This

means,then, that the court operated with a certain amount of autonomy.
However, the court in 1707 was still subject to “such Regulations for the better
»17

Administration of Justice as shall be made by the Parliament of Great Britain,

This

provision specifies that “although Parliament enjoys the power to organize and regulate

'^Windows were, during this period, a status symbol. A tax on windows, then, acted as a forerunner of a
luxury tax. In the old parts of many cities throughout Great Britain, windows can be seen blocked up, so
that their former owners could avoid the added tax.
Union with England Act 1707, Article Nineteen.
Ibid.

9

the Scottish court system, its regulations cannot alter the traditional ‘Authority and
Priviledges’ of the Court of Session or undermine its role at the top of the Scottish
judicial hierarchy.

While the Parliament could not disband or overrule the court, the

court had to operate within the limits set forth by Parliament. The Court of Session
repeatedly voiced a conviction that Parliament’s regulations power was circumscribed
«19

by the requirements of supremacy and inferiority in the Acts.

There was an ongoing

and fluid debate over the nature of the relationship between the court and Parliament in
eighteenth-century Britain.
Article Nineteen also outlines the structure of the Scottish court system.

It

describes the judicial system in Scotland as one of inferior courts governed and checked
by the Court of Session. The Acts of Union do not change this, but rather assert that “all
Inferior Courts of Justice within the said Limits do remain subordinate, as they are now to
„20

the Supream Courts of Justice with the seime in all time coming,

This essentially

provided for a system of superior and inferior courts. While this clause did not give the
Court of Session the power of hearing appeals, it did grant the Court some judicial
control over the inferior courts.
The final section of note in Article Nineteen is the separation of the English and
Scottish courts’ jurisdictions. Scotland and England, as far as the scope of their judicial
power, were to remain decidedly separate under the Acts of Union.

The courts of

England were to “have no power to Cognosce, Review, or Alter the Acts or Sentences of

James Pfander and Daniel Birk, “Article III and the Scottish Judiciary” in Harvard law Review, 124
(2011): 1619.
Ibid., 1623.
20
Union with England Act 1707, Article Nineteen.

10

»21

the Judicatures within Scotland, or stop the Execution of the same.

This separation,

along with the provision making all Scottish courts inferior to the Court of Session,
effectually ensured that the Court of Session remained the highest court in Scotland.
While the Court of Session did not have the ability to review, by means of appeal, lower
court decisions, “its supervisory powers allowed the Court of Session to correct serious
errors and to prevent lower courts from exceeding the boundaries of their own
„22

jurisdictions.

This was, then, essentially, a practical form of judicial review even if

Article Nineteen did not specifically outline such a role for the Court of Session.
The separation ofjurisdictions for the English and Scottish courts is important in
that it recognizes the vast difference between the English and Scottish judicial systems.
The language of Article Nineteen reflects these differences. For two nations binding
themselves together in perpetuity, the differences in form and structure of the courts must
have been beyond reconciliation.

Comparison of the English and Scottish Courts

While England and Scotland were united by a shared monarchy and Parliament,
This was, in large part, due to their major

the two judiciaries remained distinct.
differences.

These differences, alluded to in Article Nineteen, deserve a closer

inspection.
The Scottish judiciary, as has been somewhat illuminated above, operated under a
single supreme court. This court oversaw a number of inferior courts, hearing appeals on

22

Union with England Act 1707, Article Nineteen.
Pfanderand Birk, 1620.

11

their decisions and acting as an arbitrator when differences appeared among the courts.
The system, then, appeared as a pyramid in shape, the Court of Session at the pinnacle,
and the numerous lower courts forming the base. The court “combined a supervisory
«23

authority with the power to hear cases in law, equity, and admiralty,

England, on the

other hand, adopted a horizontal judicial model in which “superior courts exercised
„24

primarily a trial rather than an appellate jurisdiction,

In this system, there were

multiple high courts, each presiding over a specific type of law.
The English court system featured a number of courts at various levels with
varying jurisdictions. This meant that “the Decisions of Judgements being made by
divers Courts, and several Independent Judges and Judicatories, who had no common
Interest among them in their several Judicatories, thereby in Process of Time every
«25

several County would have several Laws, Customs, Rules, and Forms of Proceeding.
The English system would have appeared, then, not as a pyramid, but as a series of linked
circles. The English system, because of its structure, lacked the uniformity and efficiency
of the Scottish Court. This is an important difference when considering the ideological
and constitutional basis for the federal court system in the United States of America. It
would appear that, at least in terms of overall structure, the American federal court
system followed from the Scottish example.
Appeals existed in English courts as early as the fifteenth-century. The King’s
Bench, during this time, served in part as a court of appeals,

Parliament, too.

occasionally heard cases as a court of last resort as late as the eighteenth century. This

23

Pfander and Birk, 1616.
Ibid., 1621.
25
Matthew Hale, The Histo/y ofthe Common Law ofEngland td. Charles Gray (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1971), 90.
24

12

right to appeal extended to the inhabitants of the British colonies in North America, as
well. Parliament, in their instructions to colonial governors, wrote that they judged “it
absolutely necessary that all out subjects may have liberty to appeal unto us...if either
party shall not rest satisfied with the judgement of our governor or commander in chief
»26

they may then apply to us in our Privy Council,

However, the lack of a “written

constitution, a well-developed theory of separation of powers and a legal distinction
between constituent and legislative organs” hindered the growth ofjudicial review in the
27

English court system.
Along with the differences in hierarchical structure, the Scottish and English court
systems differed in their relationship to Parliament. English courts acknowledged the
»28

sovereign power of Parliament to remake the law and remodel English institutions.
The Scottish courts, however, “operated with a constitutional framework that was meant
»29

to shield them from parliamentary control and alteration,

Britain, during this period.

did not operate under a specific written constitution. There existed, though, a clear
conception of the constitution. The constitution, as it was understood, formed a contract
between the sovereign and the subjects. The only way to change this contract was
through the mutual consent of both parties. This belief led to the view that far from
having the authority to change the constitution or any part of the British world.
30

^99

Parliament was ‘limited and circumscribed by the constitution that formed it.

The

Scottish judiciary’s relationship with the sovereign could not be altered by Parliament
26

Regulation of Appeals to the Council and Crown” in Royal Instructions to British Colonial Governors.
1670-1776 ed. Leonard Labaree(New York: Octagon Books, 1967), Vol. 1, 320.
27
David Deener,“Judicial Review in Modem Constitutional Systems” in The American Political Science
Review, 46,(1952): 1081.
28
Pfander and Birk, 1617.
29
Ibid., 1617.
30
Jack Greene, The Constitutional Origins ofthe American Revolution (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011), 127.
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alone.

Given this interpretation, the Scottish Court of Session understood its role as

beyond the control of Parliament.
The Acts of Union did not alter this essential difference. Rather, Article Nineteen
expressly limited the alterations Parliament was able to make in Scotland’s judicial
system. There was, then, a fundamental difference in the two systems, The English
system operated as an auxiliary arm of the monarchy and Parliament. As such, it was
prone to swings in policy based on the political party that held power at any given time.
The Scottish system, on the other hand, had the basis for some amoimt of judicial
independence.

In this way, too, it would appear that the American model followed

closely after the Scottish judicial system as outlined in Article Nineteen of the Acts of
Union.
The current United States federal court system, as far as its structure and its
relationship to other branches of government, descended from, or was at least the
beneficiary of, the Scottish Court of Session. However, the modem Supreme Court and
federal court system did not materialize until the nineteenth-century. It was under Chief
Justice John Marshall that the decisions of Marbury v Madison (1803) and McCulloch v
Maryland (1819) forever shaped the purpose and nature of the federal judiciary in the
United States of America.

14

Chapter II

The Form and Function of the Judiciary in the Early Republic

The Constitution and the Judiciary

The failure of the Articles of Confederation, the original founding document of
31

the United States, appeared imminent by the middle of the 1780s.

The Articles of

Confederation, which featured a loosely structured national government based on
republican principles, did not meet the basic requirements for the continued prosperity or
stability of the new nation. The document failed to provide adequate mechanisms for the
collective military defense of the country or for binding the existing states into a cohesive
country. When the several states sent representatives to Philadelphia in May of 1787 to
discuss possible ways to improve the Articles of Confederation, the convention
completely abandoned the Articles in favor of an entirely new founding document, the
United States Constitution.
The Constitution, ratified in the states throughout the rest of 1787, dramatically
32

altered the nature of the national government.

The document gave significantly more

power to the central government, to be known as the federal government.

The

31

To many, Shay’s Rebellion, in 1786, showed the inability of the national government to effectively
contain and defeat even a small uprising. This apparent weakness, and the financial uncertainty that led to
the
rebellion, energized calls to reconsider the applicability of the Articles of Confederation.
32
" Nine states needed to approve the Constitution for the document to take effect. Rhode Island was the last
state to officially ratify the Constitution in May of 1790.

15

Constitution contained seven articles.

Among other things, these articles divided the

federal government into three distinct branches, the executive, the legislative, and the
33

judicial.

The founders devised this separation of powers in an attempt to ensure a

limited national government.
Of the seven articles of the Constitution, only one dealt with the establishment of
the national judiciary in the United States of America, Article III, divided into three
sections, detailed the structure and jurisdiction of the federal court system. Ajticle III
closely followed the example, in both language and purpose, set by Article Nineteen of
the Acts of Union of 1707, the foundation of the Scottish court system. The framers of
the Constitution were able to look back on the form of the Acts of Union as a guide in
establishing the new national judiciary for the United States of America. Their collective
knowledge of the Acts of Union played a role in the formation of Article III and the
foundations of the federal judiciary.
The Acts of Union had been in effect for eighty years by the time the several
states sent representatives to Philadelphia in 1787. This temporal reality does not, in
itself, prove that the framers of the Constitution knew and appreciated the role of the
Court of Session as outlined by Article Nineteen of the Acts of Union,

There is.

however, ample evidence that the representatives at the Philadelphia Convention
understood and were aware of unique aspects of the Scottish judiciary. This evidence
takes a variety of forms. First, Madison’s notes on the convention mention the Scottish
government in three places. On June 5, 1787, Benjamin Franklin, during a discussion on
33

This three-branched government was not originated by the framers of the Constitution. John Locke,
whose influence on the Declaration of Independence is abundantly clear, posited a three-branched
government in his essay Two Treatises on Government, which was published in 1690. Locke s government
consisted of an executive, a legislative, and a federative branch. It was not until Montesquieu published The
Spirit ofthe Laws in 1748 that a separate judicial branch was considered.

16

the appointment of federal judges, “in a brief and entertaining manner related a Scottish
»34

mode, in which the nomination proceeded from the Lawyers.

Madison mentioned

Scotland in regards to Constitutional representation on June 11. During a debate on the
rights of states in the national Constitution, Madison also referred to the Acts of Union,
writing that “when that Union was in agitation, the same language of apprehension which
has been heard from the smaller states, was in the mouths of Scotch patriots. The articles
however have not been violated and the Scotch have found an increase of prosperity and
»35

happiness,

While none of these discussions relate directly to the role of the judiciary.

they indicate a level of familiarity with the Scottish government.
Second, James Wilson, a delegate at the Philadelphia Convention, “argued in his
1791-1792 Lectures on Law that a properly constituted judicial system should resemble a
»j36

pyramid, with a broad base of inferior jurisdictions and a single supreme court on top.
Born in Scotland, and educated at St. Andrew’s University outside of Edinburgh “where
he apprenticed at law for three years,” Wilson advocated a judicial structure exceedingly
similar to that of the Scottish judicial system.^”^ Though he was a highly capable lawyer, it
is extremely unlikely that Wilson conceived of this structure on his own. Given the
differences between the English and Scottish systems, and his own familiarity with
Scotland, it is probable that Wilson looked to the Court of Session as an example when
enumerating the powers of the Supreme Court as a member of the convention’s
Committee of Detail.

34

Madison, Vol. I, 120.
Ibid., Vol. 1,493.
36
Pfander and Birk, 1620.
37
Ibid., 1633.
35

17

Third, such Scots as Lord Karnes exerted a heavy influence on law in the
American colonies.

While Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England are

widely looked to as a guide to early American law, “even lawyers of the later colonial
period, including such American patriots as Thomas Jefferson, John Adams, James
Wilson, and George Wythe...had indeed completed their legal studies before the
Commentaries anived in America.”^*

Karnes, a leading figure of the Scottish

Enlightenment and a judge on the Scottish Court of Session, has been largely overlooked
in the study of early American jurisprudence. The works of Karnes “were widely read in
revolutionary America and exerted a profound influence during the period surrounding
,,39

the formation of the American republic.

His influence spread rapidly in America

before the revolution. Benjamin Franklin, on his visit to Scotland, stayed with Lord
Karnes and, after his return to America, wrote that The Principles ofEquity would “be of
„40

the greatest advantage to the judges in our colonies.

Wilson, Madison, Jefferson, and

Adams each “referred to Karnes in their writings on law and government, and all engaged
„41

deeply with his work during their legal studies,

Prominent American states, then.

enjoyed a strong familiarity with the writings of Lord Karnes and the workings of the
Scottish Court of Session.
The language of Article III of the Constitution displayed a strong resemblance to
that of Article Nineteen of the Acts of Union of 1707. Such a similarity did not, on its
own, reflect a causal relationship. The framers’ knowledge of the Scottish form, along
with the resemblance of Article III to Article Nineteen, suggests that the foundations of
38
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the federal court system in the United States can be traced back to the Court of Session
and the Scottish judiciary.
Section One of Article III, declared that the federal judicial power “shall be vested
in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time
«42

ordain.

This subordination of all courts to the Supreme Court clearly bore a marked

resemblance from Article Nineteen, which stated that “all Inferior Courts within said
»,43

Limits do remain subordinate, as they are now to the Supream Courts of Justice,

The

structure of the federal court system, like that of the Scottish court system, appeared as a
pyramid, with the one high court at the top and various smaller courts comprising the
base. The federal court system, therefore, clearly departed from the English model of coequal courts.
Unlike the English court system, the new American Supreme Court’s power
«44

extended to “all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution,

The only

exception to this power occurred in the event of impeachment trials for members of
Congress or the President. The Constitution, then, allowed for no other court or judicial
system outside the authority of the one supreme court. This, too, clearly builds on the
foundations of the Scottish court system in which courts accepted cases from law, equity.
and admiralty.
While Article Nineteen established the Court of Session’s appellate jurisdiction
by granting it the ability to act as an arbitrator between the subordinate courts, Article III
of the United States Constitution expressly granted appellate jurisdiction to the Supreme
Court. The federal Supreme Court possessed “appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and
42
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„45

Fact.

Unlike the rest of the federal court system, whose power extended to all cases,

the Supreme Court’s role consisted largely of appellate jurisdiction. While in many ways
different from the role of the Court of Session, it can be reasonably argued that the
appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United States had its roots in the role of
the Court of Session as enumerated in Article Nineteen of the Acts of Union.
Lastly, Article III established life tenure for federal judges. The conception of life
tenure does not appear in Article Nineteen.

Rather, Article Nineteen outlined the

necessary qualifications for a Lord of Session. Judges, appointed by the President and
confirmed by Congress, were to “hold their Offices during good Behavior, and shall, at
stated Times, receive for their Services a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
«46

during their continuance in Office.

This meant that a federal court judge could neither

be removed from office nor have his salary withheld on account of his rulings. In many
47

ways, this enabled members of the federal judiciary to act independently.
The constitutional bases for the structure and nature of the federal court system of
the United States of America became visible in Article III.

The article created the

hierarchical structure, the jurisdiction, and the term lengths of federal judges,

It is

evident that the framers of the Constitution drew on the knowledge and experience of the
Scottish Court of Session when outlining the role of the federal judiciary under Article
III.

45
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The Purpose of the Framers

The Constitution needed to be ratified by two-thirds of the states. The document
came under extreme scrutiny during the late spring and summer of 1787.

The

deliberations and discussions of the newly proposed Constitution, especially the notes of
James Madison from the Philadelphia Convention, the Federalist Papers, and the Letters
ofBrutus give great insight into the arguments for and against the Constitution. Both the
notes and debates detail the purpose of the framers regarding the foundations of the
federal judicial system.
James Madison took meticulous notes on the convention debates. He mentioned
48

construction of a national judiciary as early as the fourth day of the convention,

When

considering the independence of the judicial branch, as posited by Montesquieu and
implemented by Article III, Madison wrote that judges “ought to be able to expound the
laws as it should come before them, free from the bias of having participated in its
»49

formation.

The independence of the judiciary appeared absolutely necessary to

Madison and the other framers of the Constitution.
The convention also considered the appellate role of the Supreme Court.
Discussed on June 19, the New Jersey Plan gave the federal tribunal “an appellate
jurisdiction only - even in criminal cases.”^° Madison, in his notes, indicated that he did
not think this limited role adequate or useful for the new judiciary.

On August 27,

Gouverneur Morris questioned the extent of the appellate role as outlined in Article III.
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He wished to know whether appellate jurisdiction “extended to matters of fact as well as
law — and to cases of Common law as well as Civil law.”^* Wilson, a leading member of
the Committee of Detail that defined the role of the judiciary answered that the appellate
role did extend to matters of face and law in both common and civil law. Richard
Caswell, governor of North Carolina, wrote in 1787 that

the plan of a National Parliament and Supreme Executive with adequate powers to the
Government of the Union will be more suitable to our situation & circumstances than any other,
but I should wish also an independent Judicial department to decide any contest that may happen
between the United States and the individual States.^^

There existed at the time of ratification, then, the idea that the new judiciary should act as
an arbitrator between the two levels of government.
Madison viewed the judiciary as deserving of “an opportunity of remonstrating
against projected encroachments on the people...and they will have an opportunity of
taking notice of these characters of a law, and of counteracting, by weight of their
opinions the improper views of the Legislature.”^^ The notes of James Madison from the
Constitutional Convention give the earliest picture of the purpose of the federal judicial
system.

Madison outlined a system independent of, and arguably contrary to, the

legislative authority. For Madison, an independent judiciary with the ability to review
legislation was a necessary foundation ofthe new nation.
Not all of the delegates, though, agreed with Madison’s view. Luther Martin, a
delegate from Maryland, voiced strong concerns about the nature of the judiciary.
Principally, Martin was concerned with the power afforded to the branch.

First, he

Madison, Vol. II, 431.
“Richard Caswell to R. P. Spaight, in The Records ofthe Federal Convention of1787 ed. Max Farrand
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1937), Vol. Ill, 63.
” Madison, Vol. II, 431.
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worried that deciding whether “any laws or regulations of the Congress, or any acts of its
President or other officers, are contrary to, or not warranted by the constitution, rests only
54

with the judges” that they had appointed.

There might, then, be little incentive for the

judges to protect the Constitution from an over-reaching legislature or executive.
Second, Martin was concerned that jury trials, “which have ever been the boast of the
English constitution, which have been by our several State constitutions so cautiously
secured to us, - jury trials, which have so long been considered the surest barrier against
55

arbitrary power” would be taken away.

The wording of Article III, that the Supreme

Court was to have the ability to review both matters of law and fact, led Martin to this
conclusion. For the court, he claimed, could summarily dismiss a jury’s verdict on
appeal. This role went beyond the historical powers of the courts and intended “to give a
power very different from what our court of appeals, or any court of appeals in the United
»56

States or in England enjoys, a power of the most dangerous and alarming nature.
There was, then, great fear over the extent of the power of the judiciary and its role in the
new nation.
The Federalist Papers, written by Alexander Hamilton, John Jay, and James
Madison, provided a detailed defense of the federalist, or pro-Constitution, platform. The
Federalist Papers, a series of essays originally published in The Independent Journal in
New York, attempted to promote the Constitution to the ratifying convention of that state.
Of the eighty-five essays, six analyzed the judicial branch as outlined by the Constitution.
The most influential of these, Hamilton’s Federalist 78, stressed the need for a separate
54
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judicial branch in the new government. Hamilton argued not only for the necessity of a
judicial branch, but for the necessity of an independent judiciary.
Hamilton maintained that the ability of a judicial branch to curtail the power of
the legislature and executive, coupled with the inherent weakness of the judiciary, made
an independent judicial branch a necessity for the new government,

As Hamilton

imagined it, the judicial branch would not only decide cases between citizens, but would
rule on the constitutionality of legislation. In this way, the judicial branch would be both
the protector of the citizens and of the Constitution. If this was the case, as Hamilton
argued it would be, such a branch would be a great benefit to the new government.
Moreover, the inherent weakness of the judiciary meant that it would not overstep its
bounds.

Unlike the executive and legislative branches, the judicial branch “has no

influence over either the sword of the purse; no direction either of the strength or of the
»57

wealth of the society; and can take no active resolution whatever.

The judiciary,

unlike the other branches, could not initiate action. Rather, it had to wait for a case to be
brought before it. Hamilton believed that this ensured that the judiciary was “the least
dangerous to the political rights of the Constitution” and “beyond comparison the
weakest of the three departments of power.”^^ Establishing a judicial branch, therefore,
would afford protection from legislative and executive tyranny without any additional
risk to the citizens.
For the judicial branch to protect the citizens successfully, Hamilton believed that
it must possess two qualities. First, the judiciary had to be independent of the other two
branches. Hamilton believed Montesquieu was correct to claim that “there is no liberty.
Alexander Hamilton, John Madison, and John Jay,“Federalist 78” in The Federalist with Letters of
"Brutus" ed. Terrence Ball(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 378.
Ibid.
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if the power of judging be not separated from the legislative and executive powers.

i59

That is to say, that the power to judge the constitutionality of a law should be separate
from the power of creating the law. To combine the two would endanger the collective
rights of the people. Hamilton believed that an independent judiciary was “peculiarly
essential in a limited Constitution...which contains specific exceptions to the legislative
^^60

authority.

In such a government, if the legislature refused to sanction itself according

to the limits set forth in the founding document, and the judiciary was under the control
of the legislature, there would be no forum for a redress of grievances.

Hamilton

believed, for this reason, that the judicial branch must be independent of the legislature
and executive.
There was only one way, according to Hamilton, to achieve the desired
independence of the judiciary. Life tenure, and a corresponding financial security, was
the second quality posited by Hamilton as necessary for the experiment of an independent
judiciary to succeed. In a republic, Hamilton wrote, life tenure is an “excellent barrier to
the encroachments and oppressions of the representative body...it is the best expedient
which can be devised in any government, to secure a steady, upright, and impartial
administration of the laws.5»61 Hamilton appealed to Americans’ distrust of legislative
power, which had grown during the colonial clashes with Parliament.

Life tenure

provided a safe-guard to judges which Hamilton believed to be “essential to the faithful
„62

performance of so arduous a duty.

Along with life tenure, the Constitution expressly

prohibited Congress from lowering the salary of a federal judge. Congress could not, for
59
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instance, effectively force a controversial judge from the bench by lowering his salary
below a living wage.

Like life tenure, the inability of Congress to lower judges’

compensation allowed the judges of the federal court system to act independently of the
political process. Federal judges would be free from Congressional and Presidential
control. This freedom, Hamilton thought, would make the only obligation of federal
judges to protect the Constitution as they interpreted it.
Not all of the founders, however, accepted federalist arguments. The Constitution
inspired a turbulent debate throughout the summer of 1787. Presumably written by
Robert Yates, the Letters ofBrutus voiced an important alternate view in response to the
63

Federalist Papers.

Brutus believed that the national government under the Constitution

wielded far too much power, rendering it reminiscent of the very government the
colonists had fought to escape less than a decade earlier. The public debate among the
framers allowed the constitutional foundations of the federal judiciary to be actively
considered.
A major point of contention between the federalists and anti-federalists was
whether the court system could be truly independent. The judiciary, wrote Brutus, “will
lean strongly in favour of the general government, and ^^dll give such an explanation to
„64

the constitution as will favour an extension of its jurisdiction,

Whereas Hamilton

believed the judiciary to be the weakest of all branches of government, the anti-federalists
clearly saw the opportunity for the court to expand its own, and the federal government’s.

Unlike the Federalist Papers, the author, or authors, of the Letters ofBrutus never came forward. It is
presumed to be Robert Yates. Along with Alexander Hamilton, Yates represented New York at the
Constitutional Convention. He was an outspoken opponent of the Constitution and a close political ally of
the governor of New York. These pieces of evidence, though far from perfect, make Robert Yates a
convincing candidate for the author of the Letters ofBrutus.
Hamilton et al., 504.
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influence. Furthermore, the anti-federalists questioned whether there even should be a
national judiciary. Though the anti-federalist viewpoint did not succeed in blocking the
ratification of the Constitution, its basic perspective continued into the nineteenthcentury, and even beyond. Such opposing views formed the basis of the debate over
federal supremacy in the American judiciary.

The Pre-Marshall Court

The judicial branch was the least expounded upon of the three branches of
government in the Constitution. Article III was relatively short compared to the lengthy
explanations of the executive and legislative powers. This was reflected in the rather
small amount of time dedicated to the judiciary during the Constitutional Convention.
Though some of the intent of the framers can be understood through examination of their
notes and letters, much of the role and workings of the judiciary were left open to
interpretation. The Constitution, and its lack of specificity regarding the role of the
judiciary, afforded the early Justices of the Supreme Court an opportunity to shape the
role of the institution.
The primary objective of the court during its early period was not constitutional
,,65

interpretation, but, rather, “to bolster and consolidate the new federal government.

Two closely-related reasons contributed most to a movement away from the judiciary as
imagined at the Constitutional Convention and a return to the long-standing role of the
courts in America, that is to say, back to a role similar to the various colonial courts.
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First, the Supreme Court experienced a large amount of turnover in its first years.
Second, the early court lacked a sense of institutional identity.
The early court did not have the high level of respectability it now enjoys. A
number of influential Americans, including “Charles Pinckney, Edward Rutledge,
Alexander Hamilton, and Patrick Henry - significant statesmen in the 1790s - refused to
be appointed to the Court, and several men who were appointed resigned to accept other
i»66

positions.

The resulting lack of continuity in membership hindered the Supreme

Court’s effective development of a unique niche within the early American political
spectrum.
Before the appointment of John Marshall as the fourth Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court in 1801, twelve other men had served as Justices.^^ The court at this time
consisted of five Associate Justices and one Chief Justice. Two of these Justices, in
particular, made substantial contributions to the role of the court and the establishment of
federal supremacy in the United States: Chief Justice John Jay and Associate Justice
James Wilson.
John Jay served as the first Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Jay was a lawyer
before the outbreak of the Revolutionary War. President Washington considered Jay, an
active founding father, to be a perfect fit for the position of Chief Justice. Jay imagined
the court system quite differently than his successor, John Marshall.

For Jay, “the

Supreme Court’s role in government differed in several respects from the modem
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conceptions of the institution’s role.

He believed that the risk of the several states

slipping into anarchy was much more likely, and more dangerous, than the government
becoming too strong. The more free people are, he wrote.

the more strong and efficient ought their Government to be; and for this plain Reason, that it is a
more arduous Task to make and keep up the Fences of Law & Justice about twenty Rights than
about five or six; & because it is more difficult to fence against & restrain men who are unfettered,
than men who are in Yokes & Chains.^’

To this end. Jay tended to utilize his role in the court to maximize executive authority in
an attempt to balance the power ofthe legislature.
This preference for a strong executive over a strong legislature appeared often in
the writings of early Americans. Alexander Hamilton and James Madison both wrote of
the dangers of legislative authority. This sentiment can be traced back to the colonists’
experiences over their final decades under British rule. Parliament, in the passage of the
Stamp Act and the Coercive Acts, demonstrated the ability of a legislative body to wield
tyrannical power.

These experiences served as the basis for Jay’s ideas about the

judiciary’s relationship to the executive and legislative bodies in the federal system.
Jay appeared, in many ways, to “flout the idea of an autonomous, apolitical
„70

federal judiciary.

In 1789, he served dually as Chief Justice and as the Secretary of

State. Later, in 1794, he resigned his post as Chief Justice to become the governor of the
71

State of New York.

It appeared to some, then, that Jay did not highly value his position

on the court. This apparent lack of commitment appeared especially distinct in contrast
with his successor, John Marshall.
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Unlike Jay, James Wilson had a relatively optimistic view of human nature.
Wilson, one of six men to sign both the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution, served as one of the five original Associate Justices of the Supreme Court.
Bom and educated in Scotland, James Wilson helped to bridge the gap between the Court
of Session and the Supreme Court.
Wilson firmly believed that government ought to be founded on the will of the
majority. He thought that the new federal government, therefore, “must be founded upon
»72

the authority of the people.

In this way, his thoughts mirrored the social contract

theories of both Locke and Hobbes. Even thought Wilson held that government was
based on the will of the majority, he believed that the majority was capable of error. In
an unchecked system, the majority was fully capable of oppressing the minority, even if
the minority was constitutionally protected.

Such oppression would be possible by

making alterations to the Constitutions in favor of the majority, an act that a large
majority would be fully capable of doing in an unchecked system.
Wilson, for this reason, believed that the judicial authority in the United States
needed to be separate from the other, popularly-elected branches of government that
operated on the basis of majority mle. Such a separation allowed the judiciary to check
the will of the majority and protect the Constitution. The judiciary’s power stemmed
from judicial review, the ability to consider and reject legislative acts deemed
unconstitutional.

In this way, the judiciary was able to limit divergence from the

Constitution. To this end, Wilson argued for the necessity ofjudicial review “whenever
„73

the laws though in fact passed, are found to be contradictory to the constitution.
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Wilson believed the Supreme Court to be in the best position to protect the Constitution
due to the training of its members in law and its isolation from public pressure.
To guarantee such isolation, Wilson, during the Constitutional Convention,
“fought his old mentor John Dickinson’s proposal that judges be easily removable, and he
,74

supported the constitutional prohibition against the lowering of their salaries,

Wilson

believed these concepts, taken together, would ensure the independent nature of the
judiciary. They allowed judges to act without fear of reprisal if their decisions did not
agree with the political doctrines of the party in power,

James Wilson, with his

knowledge of the Court of Session and his influence in the Constitutional Convention,
played a major role in the establishment of judicial review, life tenure, and federal
supremacy in the United States.
While the earliest manifestation of the Supreme Court differed substantially from
its modern counterpart, a number of important innovations occurred during the preMarshall years of the Supreme Court. The location of the Supreme Court, the court’s
relationship to inferior courts, and the role of judicial review all developed during this
influential period in the history ofthe Supreme Court.
In this early period, the Supreme Court lacked a permanent home. Instead, the
members of the Supreme Court rode circuit, that is, traveled individually, or sometimes in
small groups, throughout the several states hearing cases. None of the Justices enjoyed
“riding circuit, which was expensive, arduous, and dangerous, and took them for long
„75

periods away from their homes and families.
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for the Supreme Court proved to be a major factor in increasing the efficiency,
desirability, and power ofthe court.
Throughout the tenures of Jay, Rutledge, and Ellsworth, the federal judiciary did
not have an extensive system of lower courts. Because the Justices rode circuit, such a
system seemed superfluous.

Also, many of the legal disputes during this period

originally occurred in the states. It was not until 1789 that Congress divided the nation
into judicial districts and appointed district judges and attorneys. The Supreme Court,
then, served as a court of last resort on appeals falling within the limitations set out under
the Constitution. The Supreme Court finally settled in the new capitol of Washington,
76

District of Columbia, in 1801 in a basement room of the capitol building.

Though many of the functions of the Supreme Court had not fully developed in
the pre-Marshall court, from its earliest days, the court exercised the power of judicial
review. Less than a year into their appointment to the court, “Chief Justice John Jay and
Associate

Justice

William

Cushing, on circuit. declared

several

states’ laws

»77

unconstitutional.

The court also exercised judicial review over federal law in

Hayburn 's Case 2 U.S. 409 (1792) which centered on the constitutionality of the Invalid
Pensioners Act of 1792.
Congress passed the Invalid Pensioners Act of 1792, allowing veterans of the
Revolutionary War to apply to the various federal circuit courts for pensions.

The

decisions of the courts in these cases were then to be reviewed by the Secretary of War.
While the Supreme Court never ruled on the constitutionality of the act, five of the six
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Justices declared the act unconstitutional as members of their circuit courts. Congress
repealed the Invalid Pensioners Act before the full body of the united Supreme Court met
to rule on the legislation. The Supreme Court, in this period, agreed “that the Court could
declare congressional statutes unconstitutional.

J8

Hayburn's Case showed that the

federal courts could not only review various state statutes with regard to constitutionality,
but that the courts had the authority to rule federal law unconstitutional as well. Because
the Supreme Court, however, did not officially rule on Hayburn 's Case, the court did not
fully establish judicial review as a permanent role of the Supreme Court. The revisionary
role of the federal judicial system, though, developed early in the history of the court and
has been maintained ever since.
The earliest years of the Supreme Court were foundational to the development of
the role of the federal judiciary. John Jay and James Wilson exerted large influence in
shaping the role and purpose of the young institution. Jay, the first Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, helped to define the role of the federal judiciary through his decisions as
a member of the federal circuit courts and the Supreme Court. James Wilson shaped the
federal judiciary both through his work during the Constitutional Convention and through
his service as an original Associate Justice on the Supreme Court.

Wilson and Jay,

through decisions such as Hayburn's Case, delineated the role of the federal judiciary in
the United States. The pre-Marshall years also developed the Supreme Court in relation
to its permanency, its relationship to inferior courts, and the power of judicial review.
Chief Justice John Marshall, in his most famous decisions of Marbury v Madison 5 U.S.
137 (1803), Dartmouth College v Woodward 17 U.S. 518 (1819), and McCidloch v
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Maryland 17 U.S. 316 (1819), built on the experiences of the early Supreme Court to
establish federal supremacy in the United States of America.

34

Chapter III

John Marshall, Spencer Roane, and Federal Supremacy in the United States

McCulloch V Maryland

The work of such men as John Jay and James Wilson helped to shape the early
Supreme Court by defining the court’s relationship to the legislative and executive
branches through the establishment ofjudicial review. The court, though, still lacked the
prominence and prestige afforded to the other branches. Given the vague outline of the
judiciary in Article III of the Constitution, there was room for the expansion of the role of
the Supreme Court. There existed, therefore, the opportunity for a strong-willed Chief
Justice to further influence the role of the Supreme Court in the United States of America.
John Adams originally nominated John Marshall as an Associate Justice of the
Supreme Court in 1798. Marshall, however, turned down the appointment. Instead, he
served as a Congressman from a Virginia district that included Richmond. After a short
time in the House of Representatives, Marshall was appointed Secretary of State by
President John Adams.

Two years after Marshall’s election to Congress, President

Adams once again nominated him for the Supreme Court, this time to fill the office of
Chief Justice which had been vacant since the resignation of Oliver Ellsworth in 1800.
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More than any other Chief Justice, John Marshall shaped the Supreme Court, and the
federal judiciary, into its modem form.
John Marshall was from Richmond. Like his nemesis Thomas Jefferson, he
studied law under George Wythe at the College of William and Mary in Virginia.
Marshall also served as one of that state’s delegates to the Constitutional Convention.
While there, he was greatly influenced by the arguments of the federalists, and eventually
lobbied for the ratification of the Constitution by the state of Virginia,

After the

convention, he maintained correspondence with a number of leading federalists,
including James Madison and Alexander Hamilton. These relationships helped form
Marshall’s political views, which, in turn, exerted a great influence over his
jurisprudence. Most important among these was his theory, to a large extent shared with
Madison and Hamilton, of the powers of the federal government.
An appreciation of the importance of precedent is also vital to understanding the
importance of the jurispmdence of John Marshall. Unlike the various lower courts, no
high court existed to overturn the rulings of the Supreme Court. Once the Supreme Court
mled on an issue, there was no further recourse. There existed, then, a system in favor of
precedent in the rulings of the Supreme Court. The court almost never overruled its own
previous decisions, and rarely accepted cases too similar to those it had already decided.
In fact, the court often looked back to previous decisions for guidance. The strength of
precedent, and the fact that Marshall served early in the history of the Supreme Court,
meant that a number of Marshall’s decisions shaped the power and role of the Supreme
Court for over two-hundred years.
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Marshall could not simply state the doctrine of federal supremacy. To do so
would have been an overextension of the court’s reach. Marshall had to build towards
such a monumental ruling. And, as Hamilton had stated in number 78 of the Federalist
Papers, the court could take no action. Rather, Marshall had to wait for an appropriate
case before he could systematically build a foundation for his eventual argument for
federal supremacy. Early in his tenure, Marshall, in Marbury v Madison, established the
precedent that the Supreme Court had the ability to review and overturn federal
legislation. Over fifteen years later, Marshall had the opportunity, in Dartmouth College
V Woodward, to expand judicial oversight to state legislation as well. And later that same
year, in McCulloch v Maryland, Marshall, building on his previous decisions, was able to
state that the federal government was supreme within its sphere. This statement was the
culmination of Marshall’s political and judicial beliefs.
Marbury v Madison (1803), arguably Chief Justice Marshall’s most influential
decision, established the permanent role of the Supreme Court as the protector of the
Constitution. The case centered around the executive appointments of President John
Adams soon before he left office. His successor, Thomas Jefferson, refused to honor the
appointments and instructed his Secretary of State, James Madison, not to deliver the
appointments.

William Marbury, one of the appointees, challenged Madison in the

Supreme Court. Marshall used this case to outline the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
In Marbury v Madison, Marshall gave the Supreme Court the ultimate power to interpret
the Constitution. This countered acts of Congress, such as the Invalid Pensioners Act of
1792, which aimed at broadening the role of the court.”^^
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The Invalid Pensioners Act was, as has been discussed in Chapter II above, addressed in Hay’bttrn ‘s
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Marshall claimed in this decision that a
Constitution is not law.

legislative act contrary to the

Marshall drew on his first-hand knowledge of the framing of

the Constitution to posit that “all those who have framed constitutions contemplate them
as forming the fundamental and paramount law of the nation, and, consequently, the
theory of every such government must be, that an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
>?81

constitution, is void.

Marshall’s claim that the Constitution represented a higher law

than any statute passed by the Congress would be foundational to the establishment of
federal supremacy in the United States. Marbury v Madison opened the door for the court
to declare federal statutes unconstitutional, which would set the precedent for Marshall to
rule on the constitutionality of legislation from the several states.
In 1819, Marshall delivered the opinion of the Court in Dartmouth College v
Woodward. The case centered on three acts of the legislature of New Hampshire which
involved the state’s challenge of a contract pre-dating the foundation of the United States.
The original contract was between King George III and Dartmouth College. The king
granted land for a college and allowed the trustees of the college to govern it in
perpetuity. The laws passed by the state aimed at altering the charter of the college
effectively to make Dartmouth College a state institution. Marshall used the “contract
clause” of the Constitution which stated that no state could pass a law “impairing the
obligation of Contracts” to rule in favor of Dartmouth College and strike down the
82

legislation of New Hampshire.

Marshall used this case once again to expand the reach of the Supreme Court, and
in turn, of the federal government. By accepting and reviewing Dartmouth College v
80
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Woodward, Marshall made clear the power of the Supreme Court to hear challenges to
state laws when those challenges involved constitutional issues. By striking down a state
law, the case represented a step beyond Marbury v Madison, which was a review of the
constitutionality of a federal law, and a step closer to the establishment of federal
supremacy.
Marshall led the way in giving practical guarantees for protecting federal
supremacy in the United States. Federal supremacy claimed that whenever a state and
federal law contradicted each other, federal law was supreme. The theory of federal
supremacy can be traced to Article VI of the Constitution. The second clause stated that
the “Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in pursuance
thereof...shall be the supreme law of the land; and the judges in every state shall be
bound thereby, anything in the constitution or laws of any state to the contrary
9583

notwithstanding.

In this way, federal law was designed to be superior to state law.

Moreover, it gave the courts the right, even the obligation, to protect the federal
government from the states.
The idea that a national government should have legislative superiority to various
local governments was not new. The final article of the Acts of Union 1707, Article
Twenty-Five, considered contradictions between the laws passed by the Parliaments of
England and Scotland before unification occurred and the laws passed by the united
Parliament of Great Britain after 1707. Article Twenty-Five stated that “all Laws and
Statutes in either Kingdom so far as they are contrary to, or inconsistent with the Terms
of these Articles, or any of them, shall from and after the Union cease and become
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void.»84 That is to say, the national Parliament had the power to overrule legislation
«85

passed by the “respective Parliaments of the said Kingdoms.

National supremacy was also practiced in the American colonies. The monarch
and Parliament often reviewed and vetoed laws passed by colonial legislatures. When the
colony of Jamaica attempted to relocate the official port of the island, for instance.
Parliament found “several great objections to said act” and did not think it “fit to present
the same to her Majesty for her royal assent” but were “in daily expectation of another act
»»86

to be passed there.

Likewise, when the state of Pennsylvania disregarded a royal

decree on the weight of money. Parliament offered its “opinion to her Majesty that the
87

99

said act be repealed, which has accordingly been done,

It would appear, then, that the

idea of the supremacy of the national government had existed in British-American
political thought for over a century before Chief Justice John Marshall specifically
enunciated the doctrine of federal supremacy in the United States.
Some delegates to the Constitutional Convention had been apprehensive about the
supremacy ‘necessary and proper’ clause. They claimed that the two clauses meant that
64

the Sovereignty or Liberty of the States will be destroyed, and the Judicial will be
88

99

oppressive.

George Mason, of Virginia, in his “Objections to the Constitution of

Government,” wrote that “the Congress may...extend their powers as far as they shall
think proper; so that State legislatures have no security for the powers now presumed to
89

99

remain to the states, or the people for their rights.

He predicted that the inclusion of
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«90

the two clauses would “produce a monarchy or a corrupt, tyrannical aristocracy.
These worries were reflected in the ratification debates.

There was lengthy debate over national supremacy and the ‘necessary and proper’
clause during the ratification of the Constitution. The Letters of Brutus dedicated a
portion of Letter I to examining the two clauses, claiming that they showed that the
“government then, so far as it extends, is a complete one, and not a confederation...so far
»91

therefore as its powers reach, all ideas of confederation are given up and lost,

There

was a real fear that the two clauses would lead to the establishment of arbitrary power by
the national government. Hamilton disagreed. He dedicated Federalist 33 to examining
the purpose of the two clauses. They had, he said, been “the sources of much virulent
invective and petulant declamation against the proposed constitution, they have been held
up to the people...as the pernicious engines by which their local governments were to be
destroyed and their liberties exterminated.”^^

The clauses were, however, “only

declaratory of a truth, which would have resulted by necessary and unavoidable
implication from the very act of constituting a Faederal Government, and vesting it with
,,93

certain powers.

Hamilton used social contract theory to bolster his argument by

stating that when a group of individuals enter into a government, the laws of that new
government must be the supreme law. Likewise, if a “number of political societies enter
into a larger political society, the laws which the latter may enact...must necessarily be
„94

supreme over those societies, and the individuals of whom they are composed.

The
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greatest danger to the nation, and that “which most threatens the political welfare, is, that
»95

the State Governments will finally sap the foundations of the Union.

The ‘necessary

and proper’ clause allowed the federal government to go beyond the powers specifically
enumerated in the Constitution. The loose interpretation of the clause opened the door to
an expansionist national government. It was in hopes of protecting the nation that the
delegates to the Constitutional Convention added supremacy and ‘necessary and proper’
clauses to the Constitution, and it was this same hope that led Marshall to establish the
doctrine of federal supremacy.
Marshall’s chance to declare the supremacy of national law came about as the
result of an act passed by Congress in 1816. In that year. Congress established the
Second Bank of the United States. Though the Constitution did not expressly allow
Congress to establish such an institution, the federalists argued that the ‘necessary and
proper’ clause, together with the Congressional power to collect taxes and print money,
gave the Congress the authority to establish a bank. A bank, its supporters argued, was a
natural extension of Congress’s Constitutional authority to tax and print money. In 1818,
though, the state of Maryland passed a statute taxing all banks in the state that were not
chartered by the legislature of that state. Only one bank fit this description, the Second
Bank of the United States. The head of the Baltimore branch of the national bank, James
McCulloch, refused to pay the tax, and the two parties took their grievances to the
Supreme Court. Written in 1819, the decision in McCulloch v Maryland established
federal supremacy.

The opinion, handed down by Chief Justice John Marshall,

determined that, whenever disparity existed between state and federal law, state law must
give way to that of Congress.
95

Hamilton et al., 150.
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The debate over the establishment of a national bank dated back to the 1790s,
when Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson and Secretary of the Treasury Alexander
Hamilton posed their opinions concerning the establishment of the first national bank to
President George Washington. Jefferson argued that establishing a bank was “not among
96

the powers specially enumerated’ in the Constitution.

Moreover, he insisted.

Congress’s constitutionally sanctioned powers can “be carried into execution without a
bank...a bank therefore is not necessary, and consequently, not authorized” by the
97

‘necessary and proper’ clause.

Hamilton countered that the word ‘necessary’ ought not

to be understood in the popular sense, as crucial or indispensible, but as meaning “that
the interests of government...require, or will be promoted, by the doing of this or that
»98

thing.

He conceded, though, that his disagreement with Jefferson resulted from the

very nature of the federal system. The consequence of a division of power between the
states and the national government is “that there will be cases clearly within the power of
the National Government; others clearly without its power; and a third class, which will
leave room for controversy & difference of opinion, & concerning which a reasonable
»99

latitude ofjudgment must be allowed.

President Washington agreed with Hamilton’s

argument, and signed the bank bill into law in 1791. This presidential decision, though,
did not create the precedent that a Supreme Court decision would have. It was this
latitude that Marshall used in constructing his opinion in McCulloch v Maryland over
twenty years later.
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Marshall focused on two clauses ofthe Constitution in his argument in McCulloch
V Maryland. First, he looked to the supremacy clause. The framers had, he argued,
decided that “this constitution, and the laws of the United States, which shall be made in
99

pursuance thereof,” “shall be the supreme law of the land,

100

Given this fact, “the
99

government of the United States, then, though limited in its powers, is supreme,

101

So

simply argued, Marshall declared federal supremacy over state law.
Also important in this decision, though, was his discussion of the clause which
stated that Congress shall have power “to make all laws which shall be necessary and
102

proper to carry into execution” the constitutional powers of the federal government.
This was more commonly known as the ‘necessary and proper’ clause. The clause
appeared at the end of Article I, Section Eight, a portion of the Constitution dedicated to
the enumeration of the powers of Congress. The vague language of the clause allowed
for interpretation regarding what statutes were, in fact, necessary and proper.

Marshall

argued, based on the placement and his interpretation of the language of the clause, that
the framers of the Constitution intended the clause “to enlarge, not to diminish the
99

powers of government.

103

In this way, he shared Hamilton’s loose interpretation of the

Constitution. He also considered the lack of a phrase “in the instrument which, like the
articles of confederation, excludes incidental or implied powers; and which requires that
99104

every thing granted shall be expressly and minutely described,

Marshall’s

interpretation of the supremacy clause and the ‘necessary and proper’ clause in
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McCulloch V Maryland expanded not only the power of the federal judiciary, but the
power of the national government.
After outlining his argument for why the establishment of a national bank was
justified by the ‘necessary and proper’ clause, Marshall still had to state why Mar>dand’s
tax was unconstitutional. Marshall said, famously, that “the power to tax involves the
power to destroy” and that “the power to destroy may defeat and render useless the power
to create.„105

Maryland’s tax on the national bank would severely limit the national

government’s power to create. Moreover, if the state

may tax one instrument, employed by the government in the execution of its powers, they may tax
any and every other instrument. They may tax the mail; they may tax the mint; they may tax patent
rights; they may tax the papers of the custom-house; they may tax judicial process; they may tax
all the means employed by the government, to an excess which would defeat all the ends of
government. This was not intended by the American people. They did not design to make their
government dependent on the States.

Marshall understood the precedent that deciding for Maryland would create. It would
bring a halt to the functioning of the federal government. His goal in this case, then, was
not simply to state a loose interpretation of the Constitution, but to declare that no state
could pass statutes with the goal to “retard, impede, burden, or in any other manner
107

control, the operations” of the national government.

The language of McCulloch v Maryland was based on Marshall’s political theory
seen in Marbury v Madison and Dartmouth College v Woodward.

In McCulloch v

Maryland, “Marshall cited no cases at e\\...The Federalist, congressional debates, the
Articles of Confederation, and the Constitution are the only external sources he noted.
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The decision appeared, to many, more as a work of political theory than of law.
Marshall, himself a leading federalist, devised a broad constitutional interpretation, one
which strongly favored the national government over the states. His explanation of the
supremacy clause and of the ‘necessary and proper’ clause allowed for the expansion of
the national government’s power.

He outlined a vision for a strong and expansive

national government, qualities which came, necessarily, at the expense of the state
governments.
Of course, John Marshall was not alone in deciding these monumental cases. All
Supreme Court decisions reflect the will of the majority of the court. Dartmouth College
\ Woodward was decided by a five to one majority, while Marbury v Madison and
McCulloch V Maryland were both unanimous decisions. Marshall wrote the decisions
because, as Chief Justice siding with the majority, he had the option to choose the writer
of the official decision. In each of these cases, he simply chose himself
Nor was McCulloch v Maryland an isolated instance of Marshall’s jurisprudence.
Rather, it was the culmination of Marshall’s judicial and political doctrine. The decision
in McCulloch v Maryland built on the foundations of Marshall’s earlier decisions in
Marbury v Madison and Dartmouth College v Woodward. Though he cited neither of
these cases in his opinion in McCulloch v Maryland, they helped to establish his line of
reasoning.

Not all Americans, however, agreed with Marshall’s political views and

judicial decisions.

46

Spencer Roane and the Objections to Federal Supremacy

Though McCulloch v Maryland was a unanimous decision, there were many
Americans who did not agree with the Supreme Court. Newspapers throughout the
nation reprinted the decision soon after it was rendered. Many of these papers also
printed editorials opposing Marshall’s ruling. Those in the state of Virginia, Marshall’s
home state, were loudest in their disapproval of what they saw as the expansion offederal
power granted by the case.
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion both protected the national bank amid a serious
financial crisis and extended the power of the federal government during the controversy
over the admission of Missouri to the Union, which “raised the ominous specter of
»I09

federal interference in slavery.

For these reasons, “southern proponents of states’

rights were in no mood to countenance a Supreme Court opinion promoting the Bank of
110

the United States and justifying an expansive view of federal authority.

McCulloch V

Maryland, though a unanimous decision, faced significant opposition in some states.
As soon as the opinion was made public, Marshall wrote that his decision would
awake “the sleeping spirit of Virginia - if indeed it ever sleeps,

111

More than any other

state, Virginia had a vocal minority who clung to anti-federalist beliefs. The state was, at
this time, dominated by Jeffersonian political theory, which was in stark contrast to the
federalist platform.

Based on the ideas of Thomas Jefferson and James Madison,

Democratic Republicans argued for a strict interpretation of the Constitution, for limited
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government, and for the power, politically and economically, of the independent farmer.
Their views largely dated from the debates over the ratification of the Constitution. Anti
federalist sentiments were, however, stirred up anew by the Alien & Sedition Acts of
1798.
The Alien and Sedition Acts granted the President broad wartime powers. These
powers included the power to deport those considered dangerous to the safety of the
United States. They also criminalized the publication of slanderous writings against the
government. Jeffersonian democrats saw these acts as a violation of the Bill of Rights.
The Alien and Sedition Acts revitalized fears concerning the power of the federal
government and its ability to violate the Constitution.
Two weeks after the decision was first published, the Richmond Enquirer, the
newspaper of Marshall’s hometown in Virginia, printed an editorial by Thomas Ritchie
calling for “‘those firm Republicans of the Old School’ to ‘rally round the banners of the
112

constitution, defending the rights of the states against federal usurpation,

Ritchie

contended that McCulloch v Maryland “must be controverted and exposed. Virginia has
113

proved herself the uniform friend of state rights - again she is called to come forth.
Ritchie did not offer an argument based on Constitutional principles, but rather recalled
arguments used during Virginia’s ratification convention as a justification for his
opposition to the Supreme Court’s decision.
Marshall understood well that McCulloch v Maryland would raise the ire of his
political opponents. He believed though, that his critics had badly misrepresented his
decision. Even in those papers “where its argument had been truly stated,” he wrote, “it
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5»114

has been met with principles one would think too palpably absurd for intelligent men.

More importantly for Marshall, “if the principles which have been advanced on this
occasion

were to prevail, the constitution would be converted into the old

confederation.

115

Ritchie’s views, as far as Marshall was concerned, represented a

serious threat to the stability and longevity ofthe federal government.
Foremost among those raising objections to the Supreme Court’s decision was
Spencer Roane, Ritchie’s cousin. Roane was educated in law by the same man who
116

taught John Marshall, “the great George Wythe at the College of William and Mary.
A Virginia lawyer, Roane served in the Virginia House of Delegates before being
appointed to a position on the Supreme Court of Appeals, the highest court in the state of
Virginia.

Roane, in response to McCulloch v Maryland, wrote a series of essays

collectively known as the ‘Hampden’ essays, which were published in the Richmond
Enquirer.
Roane had opposed the Constitution from its very inception. In 1788, he wrote a
letter to the Virginia Independent Chronicle outlining some of his concerns. He claimed
to “believe that the respectable characters who signed this Constitution did so, thinking
that neither a monarchy nor an aristocracy would ensue, but that they should thereby
«117

preserve and ameliorate the republic of America.

Nevertheless, Roane was concerned

that “the powers which are acknowledged necessary for supporting the Union, cannot
^>118

safely be entrusted to our Congress.

He did not expect, therefore, “that any member of
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the Convention, at least from the republican state of Virginia, would accept a
Constitution, whereby the republic of his constituents is to be sacrificed in its infancy.
vll9

and before it has had a fair trial.

One such member of the Constitutional Convention

from the state of Virginia was John Marshall, who fully supported the Constitution. This
early letter set the stage for the debates between Roane and Marshall over McCulloch v
Maryland, the nature of the judiciary, and the theory offederal supremacy.
Spencer Roane’s ‘Hampden’ essays targeted McCulloch v Maryland on two main
grounds.

First, Roane believed that the decision represented an instance of judicial

activism, which would end in the destruction of the constitutional powers afforded to the
several states.

Second, he believed that the decision gave Congress power beyond

anything the Constitution envisioned. Roane wrote that “the warfare waged by the
judicial body has been of a bolder tone and character” than ever before,

120

Nor was it

enough for the court to “preach political sermons from the bench ofjustice, and bolster
121

up the most unconstitutional measures of the most abandon of our rules,

These two

accusations at once portray the Supreme Court not as Hamilton’s impotent protector of
liberty, but as a bastion of arbitrary power.
Not only did the court, itself, strip the states of their constitutional powers,
according to Roane, but its ruling allowed Congress to violate the Constitution, as well.
In McCulloch v Maryland, the Supreme Court stripped the right of the states to tax
federal institutions within their boundaries.

Roane argued that the Supreme Court had

enacted a “judicial coup de main’' with the intent not only to expand the power of the
judiciary, but to expand the power of the federal government in general.
I 19
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Such an

expansion would allow Congress to “tread under foot all those parts and articles of the
constitution, which had been heretofore deemed to set limits to the power of the federal
legislature.

122

Roane feared the McCulloch decision would allow Congress to extend
»123

the “sphere of its activity...drawing all power into its impetuous vortex,

The dangers

of McCulloch V Maryland led both to an activist Supreme Court and an increasingly
powerful Congress. Both dangers presented a very real challenge to what Roane, and
many others, considered the limits on the federal government in the Constitution.
Roane also challenged the relationship between federal and state courts
established by McCulloch v Maryland.

He cited two cases, Hunter v Fairfax and

Pennsylvania v Cobbett to make his argument. In Hunter v Fairfax, the Virginia court of
appeals declai*ed “an act of congress unconstitutional, although it had been sanctioned by
the opinion of the supreme court of the United States.

124

The court of Pennsylvania,

Roane claimed, had likewise overruled the Supreme Court. These two cases indicated
the amount of confusion between the state and national courts on the question of
concurrentjurisdiction.
After the Supreme Court published its decision, James Madison wrote a letter to
Spencer Roane. Madison said that it was “foreseen at the birth of the Constitution, that
difficulties and differences of opinion might occasionally arise in expounding terms and
»125

plirases necessarily used in such a charter.

Especially controversial, he wrote, were

those phrases and acts “which divide legislation between the general and local
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126

governments,” such as those discussed in McCulloch v Maryland.

Though

controversial, such phrases and acts “might require a regular course of practice to
55

liquidate and settle the meaning of some of them.

127

Madison had anticipated such a

conflict as the one that occurred between Marshall and Roane. He did not expect.
though, the decision to sanction such a loose interpretation ofthe Constitution.
Marshall, in turn, published a series of nine essays in response to Roane. The
essays, signed by ‘A Friend of the Constitution,’ were not published until Marshall was
128

sure he had “seen the last of Hampden” in the papers.

He addressed the objections to

McCulloch in a variety of ways.
First, Marshall discussed the role of the judiciary in the United States. Roane had
55

129

Marshall

argued that “the supreme court is but a department of the government,

countered that the judiciary “is a co-ordinate department, created at the same time, and
130

proceeding from the same source” as the legislative and executive departments,

If the

judiciary was, in fact, an equal branch of government, it had definite powers and
46

jurisdiction established by the Constitution because the different branches

of

government are the agents of the nation, and will perform, within their respective spheres,
131

the duties assigned to them” by the Constitution,

Marshall attacked Roane’s claim that

the court could not decide McCulloch v Maryland “without treading under foot the
principle that forbids a man to decide his own cause.

132

Roane did not argue that the

Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction in McCulloch v Maryland, but that there was a
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significant conflict of interest.

That is to say, Roane believed the judiciary was not

acting independently, but was using its judicial power to expand its influence beyond
what was constitutionally supported. Marshall thought that such a view would not only
destroy the role of the court as outlined in Article III which stated that the judicial power
should extend to all cases arising under the constitution, but would create a vacuum of
power that would necessarily lead to a state of anarchy.
Roane, Marshall claimed, wished to reduce the federal government to the status of
a league of states. And he agreed with Roane that the people of the United States had the
right to do so. But,

Let them, before they proceed too far in the course they are invited to take, look back to that awfiil
and instructive period of our history which preceded the adoption of our constitution. These states
were then truly sovereign, and were bound together only by a league. Examine with attention, for
the subject deserves all your attention, the consequences of such a system.

Such a system, according to Marshall, could do nothing but declare war or peace, and,
134

even then, “they could neither carry on a war nor execute the articles of peace,

The

league proposed by Roane was not only inefficient, but was dangerous to the safety of the
people.
Moreover, Marshall disputed Roane's claim that the judiciary was not capable of
handling such a case impartially. Federal judges, he wrote, were “selected from the great
135

body of the people for the purpose of deciding” such questions,

The court was a

composed of group of citizens to whom the Constitution granted the right to judge. The
only concern of the Justices was “the public prosperity, in which is involved their own
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and that of their families.

136

Marshall’s decisions, therefore, reflected what he believed

would bring the most good, whether that be in terms of safety or economic success, to the
nation in the future. His own political and economic doctrines played a major role in
shaping his decisions as Chief Justice.
Marshall also argued for the respective powers of Congress and the judiciary as
set forth by McCulloch v Maryland. The Constitution, he wrote.

defined the powers of the government, and has established that division of power which its
framers, and the American people, believed to be most conductive to public happiness and to
public liberty. The equipoise thus established is as much disturbed by t^ing weights out of the
scale containing the powers of government, as by putting weights into it.'^’

The error in Roane’s argument, claimed Marshall, lay in the assumption that because “a
nation has a natural right to do certain things...a nation has no natural right to do other
things.

138

Both Roane and Marshall agreed that the Constitution limited the power of

the national government. Their differences stemmed from a disagreement over whether
the government could only act in ways specifically laid out in the Constitution. As
always seemed to be the case, the issue came back to the interpretation of the ‘necessary
and proper’ clause. The difference between Roane and Marshall, in many ways, reflected
the dispute between Jefferson and Hamilton,

Roane and Marshall, a Jeffersonian

democrat and a federalist, had a fundamentally different view of the nature of the federal
govermuent, especially in its relation to the states.
John Marshall also disputed Roane’s understanding of Hunter v Fairfax and
Pennsylvania v Cobbett. While he acknowledged that Hunter v Fairfax attempted to
overturn the ruling of the Supreme Court, the decision “was reversed by the unanimous
136
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opinion of the supreme court, and has, notwithstanding the acknowledged respectability
„I39

of the court of appeals of Virginia, been disapproved by every state court.

Likewise,

Roane’s “representation of the case of the commonwealth [of Pennsylvania] and Cobbett
is entirely inaccurate.

140

Marshall, then, acknowledged the precedent cited by Roane, but

disputed his interpretation oftheir place in American jurisprudence.
Chief Justice John Marshall faced substantial criticism for his decision in
McCulloch V Maryland. The timing of the opinion contributed to a great fear over the
nature of the federal government and its powers respective to the states, especially in
those states that relied heavily on slave labor. This fear was especially prevalent in the
southern states. Virginia, Marshall’s home state, proved to be the staunchest opponent of
his ruling. Though attacked in the papers, Marshall stood by his decision and offered a
strong rebuttal in the essays of ‘A Friend of the Constitution.’ His nine essays offered
deep insight into his considerations of, and arguments for, his opinion. Chief Justice
John Marshall presented ample justification not only for his decision in McCulloch v
Maryland^ but for the theory of federal supremacy in the United States.

Repercussions

The writers of the Scottish Enlightenment, a group largely in favor of the Acts of
Union, “were committed to two tasks...first, they had to defend economic development
as natural and beneficial; second, they had to minimize the significance of Scotland’s loss
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of self-government.

Likewise, the framers of the Constitution “were advocating an

enlargement of the political arena through a Union - in their case, transforming a
confederation into a true Union...the benefits they sought to achieve through Union were
«142

to a large extent economic.

There was a connection, in terms of stated goals, between

the wi'iters of Scottish Enlightenment and the framers of the American Constitution.
Most importantly, though, both groups understood and endorsed features of mixed
government in their respective countries.
Scotland, and in particular the Court of Session, influenced the establishment of
federal supremacy in the United States of America. Scots were educators throughout the
American colonies, and their influence extended well into the revolutionary generation.
The writings of such men as Lord Karnes shaped the conception of the judiciary for many
framers of the Constitution.

Scotland’s Court of Session was instrumental in the

foundation of the judiciary in the United States. The Court of Session also provided an
example ofjudicial review. This would be of great importance to such men as Associate
Justice James Wilson and Chief Justice John Marshall and the way in which they shaped
the judicial branch and, indeed, the direction of the nation.
The decisions leading to, and then establishing federal supremacy, Marbury v
Madison, Dartmouth College v Woodward, and McCulloch v Maryland, are arguably the
most important opinions handed-down by the United States Supreme Court,

The

significance of these decisions is closely tied to the successful expansion of the power
and influence of the national government. Without the establishment of federal
supremacy in McCulloch v Maryland, the powers of the federal government would have
141
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been extremely limited. The government would have been, as Marshall feared, reduced to
the status of the national government under the Articles of Confederation, which was
unacceptable to Marshall and his court.
The importance of these decisions is reflected in the number of subsequent cases
that cite them. In 1914, the Supreme Court again decided that “the states cannot burden
by taxes the exercise of federal functions.

143

This moved beyond McCulloch v Maryland

to include all aspects of the federal power. During World War I, the court reiterated this
view that the state “cannot interfere with the exercise of the federal authority” and that
within its sphere the federal government transcends the police power of the state.”144 A
1920 case, Johnson v Maryland, reinforced the principle that “a state cannot enforce
against federal agencies a...regulation which in any degree impedes or clogs the
»145

functioning of the federal government,

In each of these cases, the Supreme Court

cited the precedent established by McCulloch v Maryland in reaching its decision.
Collectively, these cases show the continued expansion of the federal authority in the
decades following Marshall’s decision. Both the police power and the power to tax,
arguably the two most basic rights of a sovereign state, may be superseded by federal
legislation. This understanding of the relationship between the state and federal
governments can be directly traced to McCulloch v Maryland.
Not only did the federal government’s power within its sphere increase
substantially after McCulloch v Maryland, but its sphere of authority increased also. That

143

Taxation. General Limitations on the Taxing Power. Federal Agency: Taxation by State of Bonds of a
Municipal Corporation in Federal Territory,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 27, No. 8(Jun., 1914), 769.
“Constitutional Law. State and Federal Jurisdiction. Military Necessity,” Harvard Law Review, Vol. 32,
No. 1 (Nov., 1918), 81.
145
Constitutional Law. State and Federal Jurisdiction. Power of a State to Subject Federal Agencies to
State Police Regulations,” Harvard Law Review. Vol. 34, No.4(Feb., 1921), 435.

57

is to say, the decision opened new areas of government to federal regulation. One such
extension of federal power can be found in the regulation of mail. While the Constitution
gave Congress the ability to “establish Post Offices and post Roads,” those aligned with
Marshall believed this allowed the federal government to create and control the post
146

system across the several states.

This system included things not directly included in

the Constitution, extending to such actions as censoring the mail. McCulloch v Maryland
gave Congress permission to exclude “articles such as lottery tickets and advertisements.
«147

poisons, obscene literature, animals, liquors.

The federal government, after

McCulloch V Maryland, felt comfortable moving forward with the loose interpretation of
the Constitution given by the Supreme Court.
This largely is due to Marshall’s interpretation of the ‘necessary and proper’
clause. His opinion, which had especially great legitimacy given his presence at the
Constitutional Convention and his ties to Madison and Hamilton, allowed the federal
government to expand along the peripheries of its sphere of authority, as evidenced in the
case of the regulation of mail.
Though the anti-federalists and their heirs, the Jeffersonian democrats, lost the
argument over the establishment of federal supremacy, their views continued to persist
well into the twentieth-century and beyond,

The most obvious instance of these

arguments came in the build up to the Civil War. Not since the ratification debates had
the doctrine of state’s rights been so loudly voiced,

While there were significant

differences between the Jeffersonian democrats and Southern sympathizers in the late
1850s and 1860s, the two groups shared a number of important beliefs. Foremost among
146
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these was their conception of the intended relationship between national and state
government.
After the Civil War, when the state’s rights doctrine had been all but permanently
destroyed, the federal government expanded its power even further. The height of this
expansion came during the Great Depression. The federal government, basing its action
in part on Marshall’s interpretation of the ‘necessary and proper’ clause, set up dozens of
agencies throughout the country in an attempt to combat unemployment and revitalize the
economy. The majority of these New Deal programs worked on the periphery of federal
power, doing such things as bringing electricity to the Tennessee Valley and building
civil monuments and infrastructure throughout the nation. The Supreme Court eventually
ruled that a number of these programs were too limited in their connection to the
enumerated rights in Article I, and declared the programs unconstitutional.
Even today, almost two-hundred years after it was published, McCulloch v
Maryland is an important piece of American jurisprudence. The issues at stake in that
case are still being actively debated. The Supreme Court, in 2012, will hear cases on
Arizona’s immigration law and the national healthcare plan. Both raise questions about
the extension of the federal government in the twenty-first century. The Supreme Court
will, no doubt, look back to the precedent established by such cases as McCulloch v
Maryland to help inform its decision.
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